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The geography and composition of international trade are changing fast. We link a macroeconomic 
growth model and sectoral CGE framework in order to project the world economy forward to the year 
2035 and assess to what extent current trends in trade are expected to continue. Constructing fully 
traceable scenarios based on assumptions grounded in the literature, we are also able to isolate the 
relative impact of key economic drivers. We find that the stakes for developing countries are 
particularly high: The emergence of new players in the world economy, intensification of South-South 
trade and diversification into skill-intensive activities may continue only in a dynamic economic and 
open trade environment. Current trends towards increased regionalization may be reversed, with 
multilateral trade relationships gaining in importance. Hypothetical mega-regionals could slow down, 
but not frustrate the prevalence of multilateralism. Continuing technological progress is likely to have 
the biggest impact on future economic developments around the globe. Population dynamics are 
influential as well: For some countries, up-skilling will be crucial, for others labour shortages may be 
addressed through migration. Several developing countries would benefit from increased capital 
mobility; others will only diversify into dynamic sectors, when trade costs are further reduced. 
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Over the past years - perhaps owing to perceptions of increased uncertainty in the wake of the Great 
Recession - a number of long-term economic projections have been made, ranging from a time 
horizon of several decades to almost one hundred years ahead, with some of these studies also 
touching upon the prospects for international trade.1 These include qualitative, multidisciplinary 
analyses, such as European Commission (2012), multi-sector partial equilibrium models, such as IMF 
(2011) as well as computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, such as World Bank (2007). While 
the studies make assumptions about productivity advances, which then shape sectoral developments, 
they do not employ an explicit model of economic growth. Other studies, such as OECD (2012), 
Asian Development Bank (2011), Fouré et al. (2010) and Duval and de la Maisonneuve (2010), 
provide economic growth projections over the long-term. Only a few papers have combined the two 
approaches, linking models of economic growth to sectoral simulations. Petri and Zhai (2012) use the 
growth projections by the Asian Development Bank (2011) as a baseline for their CGE model. They 
focus on the economic prospects of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China and 
India by the year 2030. Anderson and Strutt (2012) make predictions for Asia at the same time 
horizon (2030), supplementing the growth predictions from Asian Development Bank (2011) with the 
ones from Fouré et al. (2010) for countries not contained in the former study. Finally, Fontagné et al. 
(2013) combine CEPII's macroeconomic model (MaGE) with its multi-sectoral dynamic CGE model 
of the world economy (MIRAGE). This study considers economic prospects up to the year 2100, 
making some simplifying assumptions about key exogenous variables, and principally aims at 
providing a baseline for the evaluation of climate change policies, although some sectoral and trade 
issues are discussed as well. 
 
Our paper seeks to extend this relatively small, but rapidly expanding body of literature in a number 
of ways: First, using the methodology described in detail in Fontagné and Fouré (2013), we combine 
an explicit economic growth model with a multi-sectoral model in order to construct scenarios for the 
world as a whole (around 150 countries) up to a maximum time horizon (year 2035), for which 
reasonable forecasts of a number of key variables (e.g. energy prices, demographics) can be obtained 
from specialized institutions (e.g. IEA (2011), UNPD (2011)). To the best of our knowledge, our 
study is the only exercise at this extensive geographic and time scale, while remaining grounded in 
realistic assumptions about key economic variables. Second, unlike other papers, we provide an 
entirely consistent modelling framework, which makes the macroeconomic scenarios fully traceable 
throughout the sectoral simulations. This is crucial in order to be able to identify the relative 
importance of key economic drivers of future developments. Third, we undertake to examine to what 
extent the main trends that have strongly altered the volume, composition, geography and nature of 
international trade in recent times (WTO, 2013) are likely to continue or reverse over the next 
decades. This is important in order to be able to identify challenges that may arise from possible 
changes to existing trade developments. Finally, given the wide scope of our simulations, we are able 
to determine the policy implications of different scenarios for different groups of countries, which 
may allow policy-makers to focus on the issues of principal concern to their constituencies and 
evaluate their options.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II briefly describes the macroeconomic and trade scenarios 
we implement and highlights key methodological advantages as well as limitations of our approach. 
Section III examines the relative impact of the main fundamental economic driving forces. In Section 
IV, we analyse whether, under these scenarios, major trends in trade are likely to continue. In both of 
these sections we discuss what the implications would be for different groups of countries. Section V 
concludes providing an overview of major policy challenges ahead and ideas for further work. 
 
                                                     





II. METHODOLOGY AND SCENARIOS 
First, this section discusses the advantages and limitations of our dynamic CGE approach. Second, the 
scenarios in terms of shocks to various economic and trade variables are introduced. 
 
A. METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS 
This paper combines CGE modelling (MIRAGE) with the macroeconometric model MaGE in order to 
address the sectoral implications of the envisaged growth trajectory of national economies.2 The 
driving forces of the changes modelled with MIRAGE are the change in countries' GDP per capita, 
the (sectorally differentiated) gains in TFP by these countries, their changing comparative advantage 
and evolving country sizes. On the demand size, country size and GDP per capita determine the size 
of markets and demand composition. With the reshaping of the world economy the patterns of 
international demand will be affected profoundly. Meanwhile, the capabilities of countries will 
change, as developing economies accumulate human capital, invest in infrastructure and new 
production capacities and progressively catch up in terms of efficiency. Finally, markets will change 
as well as exporters, leading to a profound revamping of world trade patterns. MIRAGE is providing a 
detailed description of these changes for a given classification of countries and regions and a given 
sectoral aggregation of traded goods and services (see Appendix table 3). The transformations of 
bilateral and sectoral trade flows are driving changes in the sectoral value added in each country, 
which leads to a reallocation of resources and ultimately changes in factor prices. Last but not least, 
these reference trajectories will be "bent" by the shocks to trade costs or the migratory movements 
simulated in various scenarios.  
 
In order to track these repercussions, CGE modelling is essential. The even bigger advantage of CGE 
analysis is its internal consistency: Markets are cleared, what is produced somewhere is bought 
elsewhere, available production factors bind the production capacities of countries, sectors must 
invest to produce, excess demand will be covered by net imports, the external account will be 
balanced by capital flows when needed or else the real exchange rate (country competitiveness) will 
have to adjust. Such intrinsic consistency is precious when it comes to addressing issues of an 
extremely high dimensionality, with many countries growing at different speeds, trading with each 
other in various sectors ranging from agriculture to business services. In our mind, this intrinsic 
consistency in the representation of the changing patterns of the world economy, when all factors of 
growth are combined at the country level, is an enormous asset in order to conduct large scale and 
medium term foresight activities. Still, it has limits which have to be kept in mind when interpreting 
the results. These limits are either common to any CGE model of this type, or specific to the version 
of MIRAGE used here.   
 
Common to all CGE approaches are the simplicity of the functional forms describing agent behaviour 
and the rather aggregated representation of the world economy, both imposed by computational 
constraints. The downside of such aggregation is that models do not track what is happening within a 
given sector in a given region. Similarly, simple functional forms (e.g. the absence of intertemporal 
optimisation by individual agents) imply that the dynamics of the model are rather elementary – 
meaning sequential. The model is solved sequentially, on a yearly step, and transition from one period 
to the next relies on changes in capital depletion, the sectoral allocation of new capital as well as 
changes in the labour force, TFP and energy efficiency. Also, the parameterisation of key behavioural 
parameters is rather crude and hardly addresses individual countries' idiosyncrasies. As sectors are 
aggregated, models do not fully reflect what could happen within a sector affected by e.g. a tariff cut 
on one product. Changes in tariffs, as any obstacles to trade, are modelled at the sectoral level, even if  
shocked at the most detailed level before aggregation. This implies that the impact of changes in trade 
costs (which depends on the variance of the trade costs on the top of the mean) is not measured 
precisely and that the creation of new flows of exports, the so-called extensive margin of trade, is not 
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accounted for. In a nutshell, a country that does not export a category of goods will not begin to 
export these goods, when trade costs in the sector come down, as the trade elasticity is applied to a 
zero flow. Last but not least, CGE models generally are not confronted with historical data for 
validation. Partial remedies were considered in the current exercise, notably by making sure that 
MIRAGE reproduces the observed past response of trade to changes in world income. But not all 
limitations could be addressed: For instance, if decisions were to depend on the future state of the 
economy, and uncertainty to be taken into account, a different class of models (Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium models) would need to be used, which hardly allow for any sectoral or regional 
decomposition. Regarding the extensive margin of trade, or the more detailed representation of trade 
responses to shocks in trade costs, the large scale ambition of this exercise did not allow us to use 
modelling advances sometimes implemented in smaller scale models.3 
 
We also faced specific computational or data constraints in our present endeavour that might be 
circumvented in other simulations. The first issue concerns the representation of competition among 
firms. Many CGE models fit imperfect competition, and this can also be done in MIRAGE. However, 
given the long term horizon of the exercise and the structural changes of the economies at stake, we 
were neither confident that the initial parameterisation of the model would fit well the development of 
these economies, nor were we convinced that the same parameterisation of market structures could 
apply in different economies. Combined with additional computing complexity, this led us to work 
with perfect competition. One important consequence of this choice is that our estimation of the gains 
from trade (via consumer demand or via producers' purchases of intermediate goods) is rather 
conservative, as it does not reflect variety gains, scale economies or firm selection. For the present 
endeavour, this is of lesser importance, as we do not focus on the gains from trade and specialization, 
but on trade patterns.  
 
The next limitation relates to trade in services. Not all modes of supply (as defined by the WTO's 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Art. I:2) are modelled in our exercise. We model 
services exported under mode 1 (cross-border trade) and mode 2 (consumption abroad) but modes 4 
(presence of natural persons) and 3 (commercial presence) are absent. Quantitatively, this is not a 
major problem regarding mode 4, which is currently still small, although this might change 
substantially in the future. More importantly, the absence of services supply via commercial presence 
abroad is due to our decision not to activate the foreign direct investment (FDI) module in MIRAGE. 
We made this choice as a result of the lack of reliable information on future movements of FDI 
(although a snapshot of the current situation, which is usable for CGE modelling purposes, is provided 
by Guimbard et al., 2011). This limitation is linked to the more general problem regarding foreign 
presence. We do not have reliable information on the activity of foreign affiliates, with some 
exceptions (United States and, quite recently, EU member states). The reason for this lack of 
information is that FATS (Foreign Affiliate Trade in Statistics) are not collected systematically and 
that FDI stocks (when available) are a poor proxy for the activity of foreign affiliates (Fukui and 
Lakatos, 2012). 
 
Besides these intrinsic limitations of CGE models and the specific choices made for this modelling 
exercise, CGE models are said not to take into account an important development of international 
trade patterns in recent times, namely the expansion of global value chains (GVCs), exemplified by 
"Factory Asia" (WTO-IDE-JETRO, 2011). The development of GVCs changes many aspects of trade 
patterns, how to analyse them and the way in which technology, services, investment and trade 
interplay (Elms and Low, 2013). For example, it can be shown that services are increasingly also 
traded indirectly through trade in goods (Stehrer, 2012). Baldwin (2011) provides a theoretical 
framework explaining why the fragmentation of production occurs. In order to understand the 
implications of global production networks for CGE modelling, it is important to recall that CGE 
modelling is in line with input-output studies à la Leontief, and, in addition, puts emphasis on prices, 
market clearing and substitution. Inter-industry relationships are instrumental for the construction of 
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CGE models and the origin (domestic or imported) of intermediate consumption is traced. As the 
results of changing trade patterns can be expressed in terms of value added (and this is what we do 
here), it is possible to say that GVCs are intrinsically embodied in CGE models, even if trade is not 
reported in value added terms in the simulations.4 This way of addressing the international 
fragmentation of production is still far from perfect. In MIRAGE, the geographic composition of the 
basket of intermediates applies overall and is not differentiated by importing sector. We can, for 
instance, track the various origins of imported steel in a country, but we cannot know the origin of 
steel imported by the car industry. We simply assume that the geographic origins of steel imports in 
that sector are similar to the overall distribution in the economy. Hence, GVCs de facto are present in 
CGE models, such as MIRAGE, but are not modelled as such owing to this proportionality 
assumption. Also, the activity of foreign affiliates is present in the database, but not identified as such, 
and the composition by country of origin of each imported intermediate product is present, but not at 
the level of the importing industry. Although trade is expressed in gross terms, changes in the value 
added of the sector mirrors the reaction of industries to trade shocks and take into account 
international input-output relations, albeit with less detail than in dedicated GVC studies. 
 
B. ECONOMIC AND TRADE SCENARIOS 
In order to simulate future trade patterns, assumptions about the principal drivers of economic activity 
and international trade need to be made. Given the time-frame envisioned here, these are subject to 
considerable uncertainty. While expert forecasts exist for certain variables, such as demography or 
energy prices, assumptions for other exogenous variables are based on historical experience, e.g. 
concerning productivity improvements. For population, we take United Nations Population Division 
(UNPD) projections, in particular the two contrasting scenarios “high fertility” and “low fertility” 
which are meant to encompass a range of possible demographic outcomes.5 In a similar manner, we 
rely on energy price projections by the American Energy Information Administration (EIA), who also 
provide alternative "high" and "low" oil price scenarios, as well as projections by the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) for the breakdown of energy prices between coal, oil and gas. The economic 
growth assumptions underlying these projections naturally are not identical to our growth model 
projections, but these differences are not very large for the default case. 
 
As far as the other variables are concerned, the "reference case" is calibrated using econometric 
estimations over the period 1980-2010, therefore being in line with historical evidence. The shocks 
we propose are quite simplistic, yet mimic orders of magnitude observed in the data, or theoretical 
eventualities. For instance, we calibrated our TFP shock based on the fall of the USSR or the 
technological performance of Japan during the 1990s. Sensitivity to capital mobility can either 
reproduce current but geographically circumscribed practices (low correlation between savings and 
                                                     
4 This view is challenged by Koopman et al. (2013), who compare the impact of a US tariff on Chinese 
imports using data that explicitly takes account of GVCs (using a new USITC data base) to the impact using 
conventional data (GTAP database on which our simulations are based as well). The authors use two CGE 
models, one by the USITC and GTAP. In the former model, export processing zones (EPZ), e.g. in Mexico, are 
treated as separated economies, i.e. two "Mexicos" appear in the exercise, trading with their usual partners as 
well as with their twin. Another improvement in the USITC model relates to intermediate consumption, which 
differentiates intermediate goods according to the exporting country. The upshot of the model comparison is that 
a tariff faced by Mexico (but not by the Mexican EPZ) will hardly affect Mexican exports in the USITC model, 
while it does in the traditional model. The "price to be paid" by GVC-oriented studies for providing more 
information is the absence of substitution and price effects included in traditional CGE modelling. Koopman et 
al. (2013) show how this limitation can be overcome, but for a model that is much narrower in scope than our 
approach. 
5 The two UNPD scenarios already embody migration assumptions ("normal migrations") that are 
calibrated by UN experts on a country by country basis. For these migrants, information on age, gender and 
education levels are not known and, thus, we consider them as natives. However, we consider migration to also 
be a source of uncertainty, and focus on the two main migratory flows towards the EU and the United States, 
which would roughly double the flows presumed by UNPD. These "additional" migrants (as opposed to the ones 
embedded in UNPD projections) are assumed to be characterized by the life expectancy of their destination, 




investment in non-OECD countries), or encompass the theoretical eventuality that countries 
progressively close their capital flows with the rest of the world. Finally, the trade opening scenario, 
even if extreme, is not out of touch with reality, such as the full liberalization scenarios used 
elsewhere (e.g. Anderson and Martin, 2006). For the lower bound as well, pre-Uruguay Round tariffs 
would simply imply making use of existing binding overhang between applied and bound ceiling rates 
for certain countries and products.6 
 
Hence, we take uncertainty into account by developing two "extreme" trajectories: A "high" and 
"low" scenario (according to the expected impact on GDP) is designed for each main economic 
variable, which, when combined, result in an upper and lower projection. Combining positive and 
negative "shocks" in this manner not only provides a range in which future outcomes are likely to fall, 
but is also reasonable in the sense that economic downturns tend to be associated with negative 
developments for a range of economic variables, including protectionist responses, and vice-versa. 
Table 1 describes the scenarios chosen for each key economic variable.7  
 
Table 1: Scenarios, by exogenous variable  
 Low High 
Labour   
 Demography Reference case in high-income 
countries, low fertility (UNPD) in 
other 
Reference case in high-income countries, 
high fertility (UNPD) in other 
 Education convergence 1.5 half-life time 0.5 half-life time 
 Female participation No improvements Reference case 
 Migration Reference case Additional migration from SSA and 
MENA to EU, and from SAM to the US 
Capital   
 Capital mobility Convergence to I=S in 2050 Low Feldstein-Horioka correlation 
coefficient (as in non-OECD) for all 
countries 
Natural resources   
 Energy price High price scenario (EIA) Low price scenario (EIA) 
 Energy productivity +50% in high-income countries, 
reference case in other 
+50% for low and mid income countries, 
reference case in other 
Technology   
 Total Factor Productivity -50% TFP growth rate for low and 
mid income countries, -25% for high-
income 
+50% TFP growth rate for low and mid 
income countries, +25% for high-income 
Trade costs   
 Tariffs “Trade war”: return to pre-UR 
applied tariffs 
“Trade opening”: -50% in applied tariffs 
 Other transaction costs on goods +50% cost in low and mid income 
countries, +25% for other 
-50% cost in low and mid income 
countries, -25% for other 
 Services measures Reference case “Trade opening”: -50% in services non-
tariff measures. 
Notations: US stands for "United States", EU for "European Union", MENA for "Middle-East and North 
Africa", SSA for "Sub-Saharan Africa" and SAM for "South America". 
                                                     
6 Trade costs are, of course, affected by a wide range of factors of considerable interest to policy-
makers, including transportation costs and institutions. While the appropriate detail and disaggregation cannot 
be provided in a global model of this nature, there is still some indirect representation of such factors e.g. 
through changes in productivity and the assumptions on broader transaction costs. Trade costs related to 
transportation are also specifically taken into consideration via energy price developments and sector-specific 
productivity developments. 
7 Although, for simplicity, these variables are grouped by supply side factors, namely endowments and 
technology, as well as trade costs, linkages exist, including on the demand side. For example, demographic 
developments are intimately linked to savings, the geographic distribution of which in turn is influenced by the 
assumptions about capital mobility. Again, scenarios have been developed based on forecasts and empirical 
evidence. Where alternative forecasts do not exist, the flipside of a chosen scenario may simply reflect its mirror 
image. For example, the lower bound scenario on technology is symmetric to the (empirically documented) 
higher bound scenario, which ensures that the interpretation of results is not unduly influenced by vastly 




Notes: Trade costs only vary in the trade scenarios. "Reference case" means that a variable is projected forward 
on the basis of its estimated behaviour in the past, taking into account also interlinkages with other relevant 
variables. This is done for all countries in the model individually and may imply an improvement or 
deterioration depending on the estimated behaviour for the country in question. At the global level, in the 
reference case, MIRAGE is set to reproduce a conservative elasticity of world trade to income observed in the 
long run (with the exception of the 1990s, characterized by the expansion of global value chains and the surge of 
new big traders). Regarding educational convergence, half-life time is the time a country will take to reduce its 
difference with the initial position of the leader by half. Here, the leader is a virtual country composed of the 
leaders for each age group, level of education and time period. On capital, a lower Feldstein-Horioka correlation 
coefficient in OECD countries means that the correlation between domestic savings and domestic investment is 
assumed to be lower, as in non-OECD countries. This impacts the allocation of investment between countries, 
which is reduced in the former and increased in the latter.  
 
III. MAIN DRIVING FORCES OF FUTURE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
This section analyses the relative contribution of the fundamental economic factors simulated each at 
a time under the two different scenarios in MaGE. An overview showing the relative deviation from 
economic growth under the reference scenario attributable to each main economic driver is given in 
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Relative contribution of each key economic factor to deviations from GDP growth 
under the reference scenario between 2012 and 2035 (per cent) 
 
     GDP growth variation in 2035, low scenario        GDP growth variation in 2035, high scenario 
 
Notations: See Table 1. 
Notes: See also Appendix tables 1 and 2 for a further decomposition of the aggregated topics "population" 
(providing the relative contribution of changes in demography, educational attainment, female participation and 
migration) and "energy" (energy price and energy productivity). The "total" effect can be different from the sum 
of the components due to n-round effects. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
 
For all countries/regions/groups, variations in total factor productivity (TFP) have the largest impact 
by far on average GDP growth up to 2035. Developed countries can expect around one half of a per 
cent more or less average growth per year, amounting to around 9 per cent higher/lower GDP levels in 
2035. For developing countries, and especially emerging economies, continued technological progress 
is crucial. Brazil can add/subtract about 1 per cent growth per year owing to TFP developments, 
which rises to roughly plus/minus 1.5 per cent for Sub-Saharan Africa, 2 per cent for India and over 2 
per cent for China. As a result, projected GDP levels in 2035 would vary by about plus/minus 20 per 
cent in Brazil, 30 per cent in Sub-Saharan African, 40 per cent in India and more than 55 per cent in 
China compared to the reference GDP scenario. Developing countries as a group may face a more 
than 1.5 per cent difference in GDP growth per year depending on the path of technological progress, 




TFP growth could thus make a strong contribution to convergence under the "optimistic" scenario, 
resulting in an about 6 per cent higher share in global GDP for developing countries and vice versa. 
 
For many countries demography has the second largest impact if not only the pure impact in terms of 
population numbers is taken into account, but possible improvements in education, female labour 
participation and migration as well. Population is bound to grow significantly in India and Sub-
Saharan Africa. India's population is expected to overtake the current leader (China) by around 2035, 
with Sub-Saharan Africa surpassing China in 2045 at the latest, and possibly several years earlier, and 
ultimately becoming the largest region in terms of population numbers under the "high" scenario. 
However, despite these additions to the labour pool, the demographic effect on GDP is relatively 
small, increasing/lowering the reference GDP in 2035 by barely 1 per cent in India and even less in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. For these regions, improvements in education matter significantly. If India and 
Sub-Saharan Africa catch up faster in terms of educational attainment than under the reference 
scenario, GDP levels can be about 3 per cent higher in 2035. Similar results obtain for other 
developing countries in the Middle East and North Africa as well as Latin America. Increasing female 
participation in the labour force can make a similarly big impact, particularly in India and the Middle 
East and North Africa, where a lack of improvement would decrease GDP in 2035 by around 4 per 
cent compared to the reference case. For several developed countries as well as China population 
numbers are expected to decline having an unfavourable impact on labour force participation. 
Particularly for the European Union (EU), and to a lesser extent also for the United States, additional 
migration may have an important balancing impact. Additional migration not only affects the size and 
composition of the labour force, but can also play a positive role for savings/investment. Under such a 
scenario, per capita incomes in the EU and United States would be 2 per cent higher in 2035 
compared to the reference case.8  
 
For a range of developing countries, improvements in capital mobility will make as much or more of a 
difference. In an optimistic scenario, which would reduce the observed bias towards domestic 
investment, annual GDP growth in the developing world could be up to one third of a per cent higher 
than under the reference scenario. This would lead to 8 per cent higher levels in GDP in the Russian 
Federation in 2035, over 6 per cent in India and China and more than 4 per cent in Brazil, Sub-
Saharan Africa and the developing world overall, with GDP in the Middle East and North Africa and 
the Rest of Asia still increasing by around 2 per cent. While if capital mobility is not increasing as 
much surplus developing countries (principally the Russian Federation, India and China) might still 
avert a negative deviation from reference growth rates, Brazil would be hardest hit with almost 4 per 
cent lower levels in GDP by 2035. Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America would lose 1 per cent in 
GDP by 2035, bringing the average impact on developing countries to just above zero. Under any 
scenario of improved capital mobility, developed countries will obviously see lower investment for a 
given amount of savings. At most, high capital mobility could reduce GDP levels in 2035 by about 4 
per cent for the EU, United States and Japan.  
 
Finally, energy prices are of substantial importance to leading oil exporting nations on the one hand 
and to import-dependent countries, particularly those emerging and developing economies with high 
energy intensities (China, India, Sub-Saharan Africa), on the other. Higher energy prices, as 
forecasted by the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA), can reduce average annual 
GDP growth by up to a fifth of a per cent in China and India, reducing GDP in 2035 by almost 4 per 
cent in these countries. Exporters, such as the Russian Federation, parts of Latin America (Venezuela, 
Colombia and Mexico) and in particular the Middle East and North Africa, would benefit in such a 
scenario, with the latter adding up to one third of a per cent to their annual GDP growth and seeing 
almost 7 per cent higher GDP levels in 2035 compared to the reference case. These patterns would be 
reversed under a low price scenario, with oil exporters in the Middle East and North Africa being 
particularly hurt. However, energy prices may ultimately have hardly any effect on GDP if 
improvements in energy productivity are taken into account. Higher energy productivity (together 
                                                     
8 Per capita GDP cannot be read from the data presented here, but is easily calculated on the basis of 




with substitution effects triggered by higher energy prices) would practically wipe out any negative 
economic effects in developed countries. Similarly, the impact of higher energy prices on economic 
growth in China, India and Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, would be reduced by at least 40 to 50 
per cent in the former two countries and completely compensated for by energy productivity 
improvements in the latter.  
 
IV. TRENDS IN TRADE 
The direction, composition and nature of international trade have changed substantially over the past 
couple of decades, and many of these trends may be related to the proliferation of GVCs. Emerging 
economies have gained a larger share in global trade and increasingly trade with one another. At the 
sectoral level, developing countries have diversified their exports and obtained a higher overall share 
in manufacturing trade. The importance of services trade has also risen. At the same time, much of 
"global" trade is actually concentrated at the regional level. In analysing country, sector and factor 
outcomes of our integrated MaGE and MIRAGE simulations in more detail, we will now examine to 
what extent these trends in trade can be expected to continue in the future.  
 
Table 2 gives an overview of the combined macroeconomic and trade simulations in terms of 
projected average annual growth rates of GDP and exports up to 2035. Exports are likely to vary more 
than GDP, exhibiting higher positive and negative growth rates under the respective scenarios. 
Whether a future scenario of key economic and policy variables is rather optimistic or pessimistic 
matters a lot more for developing than for developed countries, with the former being characterized 
by a much larger variation in outcomes than the latter. While growth rates are generally lower in a 
gloomy economic and trade environment across both groups of countries, the difference is barely 
three quarters of a per cent for developed countries' average GDP growth, but over 4 per cent for 
developing countries. Growth in GDP and services trade in developing countries is widely superior to 
growth rates in developed countries in the optimistic scenario, but much less so in a pessimistic 
scenario, where growth in goods trade could advance even more slowly than in developed countries. 
Examining specifically the trade cost component, it turns out that growth in developing countries 
would be about half a per cent higher/lower in an open/restrictive trade policy environment, while 
growth in developed countries would hardly be affected. 
 
Table 2: Projected average annual growth rate of GDP, exports in goods and exports in services, 
2012-2035 (per cent) 
 
  GDP (vol.)     Trade in goods (vol.)   Trade in services (vol.) 
  High Low   High Low   High Low 
Developed 2.2 1.5 3.6 1.5 4.9 1.6
Developing 7.1 2.8 8.4 0.4 9.1 3.8
World 4.2 1.9   6.2 1.1   6.7 2.5
Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
The simulated growth rates imply that, in terms of GDP, China would be larger than the United States 
and the European Union by 2030 at the latest under the "high" scenario. India would reach China's 
current economic size by about 2025, but only under the "high" scenario, in which case it would also 
attain China's "low" scenario GDP level by 2035. Whether the future economic and policy outlook is 
rather optimistic or pessimistic is of considerable importance for Sub-Saharan Africa, whose GDP 
levels would practically stagnate under a "low" scenario, falling further behind the economic size of 
Brazil in 2035, but which could outperform the latter under a "high" scenario, and this already before 
the year 2030. The Russian Federation can stay ahead of these two regions only for an optimistic 
outlook, falling behind Sub-Saharan Africa and Brazil in terms of GDP levels in the adverse case. In 
sum, whether future developments are closer to the upper than the lower growth path makes a 
particularly big difference for developing countries. The resulting variation of around 2 per cent on 




capita incomes in this group of countries by 2035, with an even larger divergence for individual 
countries, notably China and India.  
 
Trend 1: New players in the world economy 
 
In Table 3 current and simulated shares in global GDP and exports are given for major countries and 
regions. Emerging economies, such as the BRICs group, have the possibility to further increase their 
share in both world GDP and exports under the "high" scenario. But the BRICs would also be 
particularly affected by a gloomy economic and trade policy outlook, in which case their share in 
global exports would fall below its current level, while the share of other developing countries would 
remain about unchanged. The possible difference in trade outcomes is particularly stunning for China, 
which could enlarge its share in world exports to almost one quarter under the "high" scenario, but 
would lose ground in the reverse case (in both relative and absolute terms). As far as China's GDP 
developments are concerned, it could more than double its share to reach one fifth of world GDP 
under the "high" scenario, but would only realize a modest increase compared to its present share 
(about 7 per cent) in the "low" scenario. While for developed countries, both export and GDP shares 
would decline under the "high" scenario, this does certainly not mean that they would lose out. To the 
contrary, the simulations show that developed countries would be better off realizing a smaller share 
of a "much larger pie" under the high scenario than vice versa in terms of both GDP and exports.  
 
Table 3: Country/regional shares in global GDP and exports (per cent) 
GDP (volume) Exports (volume, excluding intra-EU trade) 
  2012 High 2035 Low 2035  2012 High 2035 Low 2035
World total (2004 USD billion) 49,992 129,618 77,759  10,165 48,206 13,827
Developed 70.1 44.3 63.9 47.8 28.6 51.1
EU 28.2 18.1 24.6 18.2 11.6 18.4
USA 26.5 16.8 24.4 15.2 9.3 17.4
Japan 9.9 5.7 8.7 6.5 3.8 6.5
Other developed 5.5 3.7 6.2 7.9 3.8 8.8
BRICs 12.9 31.1 15.9 19.3 31.5 15.9
China 7.3 20.4 9.2 14.2 22.5 10.9
India 2.4 6.4 3.3 2.0 5.0 2.4
Brazil 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.0 0.8 0.8
Russian Fed. 1.6 2.7 1.7 2.1 3.1 1.8
Other 17.0 24.5 20.2 32.9 39.9 33.0
ASEAN 2.4 3.7 2.6 8.1 8.9 8.4
MENA 4.3 6.9 5.4 7.0 10.0 6.2
SSA 1.6 3.3 2.2 2.3 4.6 2.5
Other 8.7 10.6 9.9  15.5 16.4 15.9
Notations: See Table 1. ASEAN stands for "Association of Southeast Asian Nations". 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
The more prominent role of developing countries in international trade under an "optimistic" scenario 
would also entail a significantly higher share of "South-South" relationships, i.e. trade among 
developing countries, at 43 per cent of the global trade (currently at 19 per cent), which would then 
constitute the dominant direction of trade compared to 40 per cent of "North-South" and 17 per cent 
of "North-North" trade. By contrast, under the "low" scenario the situation would be practically 
inverted, with North-North and South-South trade in the year 2035 remaining approximately at their 
current shares of around 40 per cent and just below 20 per cent respectively. In absolute terms, despite 
the lower share, North-North trade would still be one quarter bigger under the "high" than under the 
"low" scenario.  
 





As far as the product composition of trade is concerned, many studies have shown – often using the 
concept of Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) – that countries have become less specialized 
over time and diversified their range of export products. The reason for this may be that while 
countries continue to specialize in sectors based on comparative advantage, both technological and 
policy factors, such as advances in telecommunications and information technology and increased 
economic integration, have facilitated the diffusion of technology and movement of production factors 
across borders. Depending on how such factors evolve in the future, current patterns of specialization 
may change. A growing literature analyses the link between export diversification and economic 
growth and, hence, illustrates the particular importance of this trend for developing countries.9 
 
Figure 2 shows possible shifts in RCA for aggregate sectors under the different scenarios for a 
selection of countries/regions. The sectoral aggregation presented here illustrates the possibility that 
the current trend of increased specialization into skill-intensive sectors,10 particularly in emerging 
economies, such as China, may be reversed under an unfavourable trade cost scenario. In such a 
situation, China's RCA in skilled manufacturing, which currently stands at just above unity, would fall 
to about 0.8 as opposed to a further strengthening to almost 1.5 under an optimistic outlook on trade 
costs. At the more disaggregate sectoral level, this would imply a further RCA expansion for China in 
traditional unskilled-labour intensive sectors, such as textiles, under the "low" scenario, while RCA in 
skill-intensive sectors, such as electronics and machinery, would significantly retreat, threatening to 
fall back below unity in the latter sector and, hence, frustrating efforts to further diversify the 
country's export base. The opposite would occur in the "high" scenario, in which case China would 
also broaden its revealed comparative advantage into high skill-intensive sectors, such as transport 
equipment, where this is not presently the case. Two main drivers are behind these developments: On 
the one hand, the continued "up-skilling" of production (implicit in the education scenarios) 
substantially reshapes comparative advantage towards more skill-intensive activities, both directly as 
the skill premium decreases, and indirectly as up-skilling leads to higher total factor productivity, 
more revenues and ultimately a higher demand in services and skill-intensive goods. On the other 
hand, a negative trade policy outlook can modify this link between skills and comparative advantage. 
As far as tariffs are concerned, these are presently lower for skill-intensive sectors, but were on the 
same order of magnitude as non-skill intensive sectors before the Uruguay round. Therefore, skill-
intensive sectors are comparatively more impacted by a confrontational trade policy scenario, moving 
China's specialization (which is particularly dependent on foreign demand in the "low" scenario) 
towards non skill-intensive sectors. 
 
Similar drivers are at work for other regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, where, under the "low" 
scenario, a lack of trade policy cooperation would leave its RCA for all manufacturing below unity. 
Conversely, in the "high" case, Sub-Saharan Africa would gain in manufacturing RCA, making also 
progress in skill-intensive sectors. At the same time, being the worst performing region in terms of 
agricultural productivity in both crops and livestock, the "high" scenario would help Sub-Saharan 
Africa to significantly reduce its reliance on agriculture (and other primary commodities), which 
currently exhibits the by far largest RCA in the region. The situation and prospects in developed 
countries in this regard are quite different. In our estimations, the United States is and will continue to 
be the technological leader in the crops sector, being also very productive in the livestock sector. It 
can be expected to increase its RCA in the agricultural sector under any scenario, but much more so in 
the "high" case, including through an additional boost from trade opening. A favourable trade policy 
outlook would also further propel the United States' RCA in the area of services, where, in the 
                                                     
9 Cadot et al. (2013) provide an excellent guide to the literature on diversification and productivity. See 
particularly Feenstra and Kee (2007; 2008) for an empirical analysis of the endogeneous nature of this 
relationship and the importance of trade liberalization in that regard.  
10 The categorization into "skilled" and "unskilled" manufacturing sectors was made on the basis of 
payroll data from the United States, taking the median of the skilled share as the dividing line. Unskilled sectors 
include for example textiles, food and metals, while skilled sectors comprise sectors, such as cars and trucks, 




opposite case, its existing RCA may be lost. The two diverging scenarios make less of a difference for 
the United States in manufacturing, where the RCA risks remaining slightly sub-par in a number of 
sectors. Predicted RCA patterns for the EU are quite similar, with the exception of agriculture, where 
it is nowhere near the unity threshold under any scenario.  
 
Figure 2: Changes in aggregate revealed comparative advantage, present (2012) and 2035 
Note: In this figure, the energy sector is not shown separately, as results would be unduly influenced by poor 
input-output accounting in certain regions and sectors, notably gas distribution and production. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
Trend 3: Importance of services trade 
 
Services account for an increasing share in global trade, in particular if measured in value added terms 
(World Trade Organization, 2013). The continued importance of services trade compared to goods 
applies to both scenarios. The increased share of services in global trade (about one quarter)11 under a 
"low" scenario is obviously influenced by possible negative trade policy developments in the area of 
goods. However, the share of services compared to goods also goes up in the "high" scenario, where 
symmetric improvements in trade costs for both goods and services are simulated, with the absolute 
value of services exports rising by a factor of between three and four in 2035 compared to the current 
situation. Developing countries as a group would capture a larger share of services trade under the 
"high" scenario, particularly owing to China, who would see its contribution to global services exports 
more than triple to account for 18 per cent in 2035. The higher involvement in services trade would 
not come at the expense of developing countries' exports of manufactures (see Table 4). Under the 
assumption of a bright economic and trade policy outlook, developing countries would continue to 
capture a larger market share in manufacturing exports as well. Again, China would be dominant in 
this regard, accounting for almost 30 per cent of global exports in manufactures under such a scenario. 
By contrast, if economic conditions were to deteriorate and countries flout on their trade policy 
commitments, developing countries would see their share in manufacturing trade fall, with China 
suffering the largest percentage decline. Larger manufacturing export shares for the European Union 
and the United States in such a scenario cannot conceal the fact that they too would lose in absolute 
terms.  
 
                                                     
11 Goods trade here comprises manufacturing, energy and agriculture. In the following, we concentrate 





Table 4: World exports of manufactured goods and services, country/regional shares in 2012 
and 2035 (billion USD and per cent) 
Manufactures Services 
  2012 High 2035 Low 2035  2012 High 2035 Low 2035
World total (2004 USD billion) 7,245 33,285 9,078   1,706 8,678 3,216
Developed 48.4 25.3 53.8 58.8 40.8 47.7
EU27 18.1 10.2 18.6 26.9 20.5 22.7
US 15.1 8.0 17.7 20.1 14.0 14.5
Japan 8.1 4.7 8.5 3.9 2.4 4.0
Other developed 7.1 2.4 9.0 7.9 3.9 6.5
BRICs 22.5 37.2 17.6 9.9 24.3 13.0
China 18.3 27.7 13.9 5.7 18.0 7.2
India 2.0 6.2 2.0 2.5 3.2 3.9
Brazil 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.4
Russian Fed. 1.3 2.8 1.1 1.1 2.7 1.6
Other 29.1 37.5 28.6 31.3 34.9 39.3
ASEAN 9.0 9.8 9.8 5.4 5.3 5.8
MENA 3.4 6.9 2.8 7.4 8.1 9.9
SSA 1.3 3.7 1.5 2.0 4.6 3.2
Other 15.4 17.0 14.4   16.5 17.0 20.4
Notations: See Table 1. 
Note: Again, intra-EU trade is excluded. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
Trend 4: Regionalism 
 
A major trend in trade policy has been towards the conclusion of preferential trade agreements, 
particularly at the regional level (World Trade Organization, 2011). In certain regions, particular Asia, 
intra-regional trade has persistently increased over the past two decades in both relative and absolute 
terms (World Trade Organization, 2013). Our model simulations until 2035, however, do not foresee 
this trend to continue unabated. Looking at some of the largest free trade arrangements, the relative 
share of trade taking place within these regions is expected to decline under the "high" scenario (see 
Table 5, which also indicates that no major changes would occur under the "low" scenario). The share 
of trade within the European Union would be particularly affected, falling more than a half, from 22 
per cent to just 9 per cent of world trade, even though in absolute numbers intra-trade volumes would 
still increase. Similarly, the share of trade within the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in global commerce would decline by more than half by 2035. By the same token, 
assuming no further preferential trade integration, extra-regional trade would vastly increase in 
importance, in both absolute and relative terms, accounting for 70 per cent at present and more than 
85 per cent of world trade in 2035 under the "high scenario". While these predictions give strong 
support to further economic integration at the multilateral level, the possibility of intensified and 
enlarged preferential trade arrangements in the future cannot be discarded, especially in light of 
certain "mega-regional" deals already being under discussion today. 
 
In order to assess the effect of further preferential trade integration on multilateral trade relationships, 
we introduce an additional, "extreme" policy shock in the "low" scenario (now called "low reg"), in 
which three purely hypothetical mega-regional trade deals are presumed to exist in the Americas, Asia 
and Europe-Africa. First, such mega-regional agreements could increase world trade by 16 per cent, 
partly compensating the downturns we observe in our "low" scenario. This set-up would obviously 
imply significant trade diversion from existing trade agreements, and the long term trend towards the 
importance of multilateralism would still prevail. By 2035, extra-regional trade relations would still 
account for 37 per cent of global trade even with the three hypothetical large free trade areas. These 




since it would be the only region to register a significant increase in its share of global trade due to a 
mega-regional agreement, and this despite trade volumes increasing also in the other two hypothetical 
mega-regions. This relative increase would mainly be due to the high initial tariff levels in this region 
compared to EU-Africa and the Americas, and this trade potential is likely to be exploited as 
negotiations within Asia have already made progress, for instance, between the ASEAN and its 
regional partners (ASEAN+6) (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2013). 
 
Table 5: Intra-regional and extra-regional trade as shares of global trade (including intra-EU 
trade), constant 2004 prices, by agreement and potential "mega-regional" free trade 
arrangement 
  2012 High 2035 Low 2035 Low Reg 2035
World total (2004 USD billion) 12,945 52,714 17,588 20,446
By current agreement 
EU 21.5 8.6 21.4 17.8
NAFTA 6.5 3.3 8.2 7.0
ASEAN 1.3 1.7 2.1 1.6
MERCOSUR 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6
By potential mega-regional agreement 
EurAfrica 34.5 23.7 35.8 35.5
Americas 9.1 5.3 10.2 10.1
Asia 10.9 17.2 8.8 17.0
Notations: EU stands for "European Union", NAFTA for "North American Free Trade Agreement", ASEAN for 
"Association of Southeast Asian Nations" and MERCOSUR for "Southern Common Market". 
Source: Author's calculations. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has examined both major trends in trade, seeking to project these several decades into the 
future, and the forces that drive such developments. For that purpose, we have combined a 
macroeconomic growth model with a multi-sectoral CGE framework and constructed two extreme, 
internally consistent scenarios up until the year 2035 – one of further dynamic growth and trade 
integration and one of a worsening economic environment and slippage in trade cooperation. This has 
allowed us to chart out boundaries for possible future developments in international trade, based on 
existing forecasts and well-grounded assumptions about individual economic variables. Making the 
influence of each factor traceable throughout our model, we have also been able to assess the relative 
importance of individual policy areas for specific countries and regions.  
 
A notable trend over the last two decades was the emergence of new players in the world economy. 
Under the "high" scenario, developing countries will continue to claim a growing share of global GDP 
and trade. In the reverse case, however, they might lose ground in trade and register only modest 
increases in their share of global GDP. Individual developing countries, notably China, appear to have 
particularly high stakes in the future economic and trade policy outlook, given the enormous 
difference in impact that the two scenarios can have. The emergence of developing countries in 
international trade in recent times has also been fuelled by South-South trade relations. While this 
could become the dominant direction of trade under a dynamic economic and open trade environment, 
the opposite is the case for a gloomy economic and confrontational trade policy scenario. Another 
trend in the direction of trade has been its increased regionalization, with the phenomenal growth in 
intra-Asia trade standing out. This trend is unlikely to continue under a "high" scenario, in which case 
trade relationships with countries around the globe would account for more than four fifths of total 
trade. The "low" scenario would leave the current state of regionalism practically unchanged, while 
"mega-regional" deals, some of which are already under negotiation, would foster international trade, 
but not necessarily along with further regionalization, with the exception of Asia, where intra-trade 




would still comprise nearly 40 per cent of world trade, thus giving new emphasis to the importance of 
further multilateral trade opening. 
 
As far as the product composition of trade and the related issue of factor intensity are concerned, an 
important trend has been the increased diversification of developing countries' export baskets into 
skill-intensive sectors. While this trend is likely to last for a continuing convergence in educational 
attainment and related total factor productivity improvements, it can be undermined in part by an 
unfavourable scenario on trade costs. Using revealed comparative advantage (RCA) as an indicator of 
specialization into various sectors, we find that under a "low" scenario, some of the emerging 
economies may be faced with a loss of RCA in skilled manufacturing sectors, such as electronics and 
machinery, and a fall-back onto an expanding RCA in non-skill-intensive sectors, such as textiles. 
Conversely, favourable developments on trade costs may not only help to expand the former, but also 
build RCA in further skill-intensive manufacturing sectors, such as transport equipment in the case of 
China. Sub-Saharan Africa would also benefit from a "high" scenario in order to diversify away from 
its heavy dependence on commodities towards manufactured exports. Services trade will continue to 
rise in importance, particularly for developing countries under a "high" scenario. A degree of 
divergence exists in this group, with regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, expanding their RCA in 
manufacturing rather than services in such a case.  
 
The second objective of this study has been to assess the relative importance of key driving factors in 
different countries. Technology has the biggest impact on economic development for practically 
everyone. This includes continued improvements in energy productivity, which would be of 
considerable importance to both developing and developed countries to counter possible effects of 
persistently higher energy prices. For many developing countries, such as India, countries in the 
Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, population dynamics are an important consideration as well. 
These countries may benefit from a demographic dividend, but much will depend on education policy 
and the integration of women in the work force in order to take advantage of these developments. The 
reverse – a declining and ageing population – will be a challenge for China as well as most developed 
countries. Policies of openness to migration can provide some measure of relief to the EU and United 
States, depending also on the skill composition of additional labour resources as well as savings 
behaviour. For China, continuing the path of rapid accumulation of capital together with skill- and 
technology-upgrading can more than compensate for these effects. Most developing countries could 
benefit to a similar extent from improved capital mobility. In the adverse case, developing countries 
featuring a surplus (such as the Russian Federation, India and China) can cushion the consequences 
on economic growth, while others, notably Brazil, would be negatively affected. Finally, trade costs 
can have a significant impact on specialization patterns in developing countries. Unfavourable trade 
cost scenarios have the potential to disrupt the successful diversification process by emerging 
economies. Resource-rich countries, for instance in Sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region, also 
need to reduce the "distance" to world markets in order to diminish their commodity export 
dependency and exposure to presumed price volatility e.g. in international energy markets.  
 
This paper has sought to fill a gap in the existing literature by combining an explicit economic growth 
model with a multi-sectoral model at the world level and for a time horizon (year 2035) that is long 
enough in order to allow for fundamental macroeconomic factors to have an impact and yet is not too 
distant in order for reasonable assumptions on their future trajectories to be made. We have also 
shown some limitations that can be addressed in our further work. One extension would be to 
explicitly address the role of multinational firms in shaping world trade patterns. To do so, we need a 
database of foreign presence at the investor-host-sector level (Fukui & Lakatos, 2012) and to 
implement foreign presence in the CGE framework by splitting production by ownership of firms. 
Goods and services could then be differentiated by ownership of the firm, instead of being 
differentiated by region of production (an i-phone produced in China would then be a United States 
product) – an approach initiated by Petri (1997).12 A second extension would be to improve upon the 
                                                     
12 An example of this approach is provided by Lakatos & Fukui (2013) on a small scale (liberalization 




measurement of non-tariff measures and their trade restrictiveness and provide for a more detailed 
modelling of agreements aimed at tackling "behind the border protection". Finally, more work is 
needed regarding the energy and carbon content of trade flows, in order to take into account how 
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Appendix tables  
 
Appendix table 1: GDP volume variation in 2035, MaGE population and energy “low” scenarios 
(per cent)  
Population  Energy     
  Education Female participation Population TOTAL  Energy price Energy productivity TOTAL
US 0.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.00
Japan -0.01 -0.07 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 -0.02
EU -0.02 0.11 0.01 0.10 -0.03 0.01 -0.01
Brazil -0.04 0.17 -0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
Russian Fed. -0.02 0.10 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.05
India -0.05 -0.21 -0.04 -0.30 -0.18 0.00 -0.18
China -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.13 -0.17 0.00 -0.17
Latin America -0.05 0.14 -0.03 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.09
MENA -0.05 -0.17 -0.01 -0.23 0.30 0.01 0.31
SSA -0.04 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.06
Rest of Asia -0.03 -0.09 -0.01 -0.14 -0.11 0.01 -0.10
Rest of the World -0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11  0.04 0.02 0.06
Developing -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 -0.05 0.00 -0.05
Developed -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.00
Total world -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.04  -0.03 0.01 -0.02
Notations: See Table 1. 
 
Appendix table 2: GDP volume variation in 2035, MaGE population and energy “high” 
scenarios (per cent) 
 
  Population        Energy     
  Education Population Migrations TOTAL  Energy price Energy productivity TOTAL
US 0.00 -0.01 0.35 0.34 0.03 0.00 0.03
Japan 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04
EU 0.07 -0.01 0.48 0.53 0.03 0.00 0.03
Brazil 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.03 0.04
Russian Federation 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.09 0.09 -0.01
India 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.18 0.16 0.07 0.23
China 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.15 0.06 0.22
Latin America 0.13 0.03 -0.28 -0.12 -0.09 0.03 -0.06
MENA 0.13 0.02 -0.12 0.03 -0.35 0.03 -0.32
SSA 0.11 0.03 -0.13 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.10
Rest of Asia 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.14
Rest of the World 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03  -0.04 0.01 -0.04
Developing 0.09 0.04 -0.05 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.09
Developed 0.03 -0.01 0.32 0.35 0.02 0.00 0.02
Total world 0.06 0.01 0.15 0.22  0.03 0.03 0.05
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